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Kwong: Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong

Reappraising the Battle of
Hong Kong
Preliminary Observations from a Spatial
History Project
KWONG CHI MAN
Abstract : This article summarises the author’s recent experience of
revisiting the Battle of Hong Kong in 1941 through a spatial history
project based on a critical reading of primary sources from Hong Kong,
the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. The spatial history approach
allows the author to propose new observations about the operational and
tactical dimensions of the battle, the experi-ence of the Canadian forces,
the performance of the Japanese forces and the reasons for the battle’s outcome, which was seemingly a foregone conclusion. This article
also discusses some possi-ble future research directions on the topic and
outlines how these new directions help with the commemoration of the
battle in Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and the United Kingdom.

T

sit The 1941 Battle of Hong Kong
(hereafter “the battle”)1 was a pivotal event in Hong Kong’s
history; the battle witnessed a temporary end to the British rule
of Hong Kong, which had just celebrated its centenary, and the
beginning of the Japanese rule that brought humanitarian disaster.
The war has been remembered in Hong Kong, China, the United
Kingdom and Japan, for it changed the lives of all who experienced
it. The event also impacted Canada, which sent its 1,975-man C
he battle of hong kong

The “Battle of/for Hong Kong” in this article only refers to the Japanese invasion
of Hong Kong that took place between 8 and 25 December 1941.

1  
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Force to Hong Kong in November 1941.2 The war brought trauma
and suffering to the C Force members, who were not adequately
compensated for decades after the war.3 While there has been much
discussion concerning the dispatch of C Force to Hong Kong and
the Allied Powers’ strategy in 1940–1941, there remain gaps in our
understanding of the battle, such as the part played by the Canadian
forces and their experience. Moreover, while few doubted that the
outcome of the battle could have been otherwise, there is still room
to discuss the plans of both sides, the factors leading to the British
defeat and the performance of both forces.
This article argues that reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong
from a spatial history (SH) perspective allows us to better appreciate
the cause of the British defeat/Japanese victory and the performance
of the forces on both sides. It suggests that Japanese operational
planning and control was poor and that the Canadian troops played
an important role in several key engagements during the battle.4
This article first reviews the major literature on the battle and then
discusses the author’s SH project on the battle. Next, it turns to
different aspects of the battle, such as the planning and interservice
cooperation of both sides and the performance of the Canadian forces
and their impact. It finally concludes by briefly discussing the factors
leading to the outcome of the battle and areas for future research.

the battle of hong kong: a review of literature
The Battle of Hong Kong was studied in detail even before the Pacific
War ended. The first systematic studies of the battle were conducted
by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) units that invaded Hong Kong.
Between December 1941 and March 1942, the 23rd Army, the 38th
2  
For the impact of the battle on Canada, see Galen Roger Perras, “Defeat Still Cries
Aloud for Explanation: Explaining C Force’s Dispatch to Hong Kong,” Canadian
Military Journal 11, 4 (2011): 37–47.
3  
For a detailed discussion of the compensation issue, see Stephen Winter,
“Administrative Justice and Canada’s Hong Kong Veterans,” in Transitional Justice
in Established Democracies: A Political Theory (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave,
2014), 128–53.
4  
For the most updated narrative about the battle in English, see Kwong Chi Man
and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress: A Military History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 117–224; and Philip Cracknell, Battle for Hong
Kong, December 1941 (Stroud: The Hill, 2019).
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Division and various independent units filed their war diaries to the
Ministry of War, some of which included the perceived lessons from
the battle. Many of these materials were later used by the National
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) to compile the official history of
the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War, published
in 1971.5 However, since then, there has been no dedicated Japanese
work on the topic, although the NIDS used one engagement at Shing
Mun Redoubt as a case study. During the 1960s, the Indian Armed
Forces had published a history of the Indian forces during the Battle
of Hong Kong, but it is difficult to obtain first-hand accounts from
the Indian perspective.6
Similarly, the British and Commonwealth garrison of Hong
Kong, despite being incarcerated in prisoner of war camps, compiled
multiple war diaries. Some of these, such as those kept by infantry
battalions (as in the case of the 1st Middlesex), offered detailed
accounts. The first postwar English account of the battle was Major
General Christopher Maltby’s (the garrison commander) dispatch in
the London Gazette, which formed the basis of the official History of
the Second World War, compiled by Stanley Kirby and published in
1957.7 In the 1960s and 1970s, more works appeared as people shared
their war experiences. The more popular works about the battle at
that time include Tim Carew’s The Fall of Hong Kong, John Luff’s
Hidden Years and George Endacott’s Hong Kong Eclipse.8 Many who
experienced the war contributed to these works; for example, John
Luff interviewed General Maltby when writing his work. However,
as archival materials were yet to be available, these works provided
only the outlines of a very confusing battle. It was not until the
1990s and 2000s that more systematic studies appeared; this period

Honkon-Chosa Sakusen [Hong Kong-Changsha Operations] (Tokyo: Asagumo, 1971).
Combined Inter-services Historical Section, Official History of the Indian Armed
Forces in the Second World War 1939-1945 (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1960).
The author of this official history had consulted some of the Indian veterans who
had fought in the battle, making this work invaluable in the study of the Indian
experience during the battle.
7  
Stanley Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol. 1 (London: H.M.S.O., 1957). The
account, however, was very critical of Maltby and his staff for underestimating the
Japanese and failing to prepare for a landward offensive.
8  
Tim Carew, Fall of Hong Kong (London: Anthony Blond, 1960); John Luff, The
Hidden Years: Hong Kong, 1941–1945 (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post,
1967); and George Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1978).
5  

6  
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also witnessed the emergence of studies focusing on the Canadian
experience.9 Some of these works, such as Tony Banham’s Not the
Slightest Chance, Oliver Lindsay’s (a British Army historian) Lasting
Honor and The Battle for Hong Kong, Philip Bruce’s Second to
None and Philip Snow’s The Fall of Hong Kong, became standard
references for the topic in the following decades.10
In the 2010s, works that combined English and Japanese firsthand accounts and war diaries of the battle emerged, such as Exposed
Outpost (Chinese), Old Soldiers Never Die (Chinese) and Eastern
Fortress.11 These works deepen our understanding of the events from
the Japanese perspective by returning to the war diaries of individual
units and the Japanese informal regimental histories. More updated
English accounts based on extensive research of archival materials
and first-hand accounts also appeared, such as David Macri’s
Clash of Empires in South China and Philip Cracknell’s Battle
for Hong Kong.12 However, as even more Japanese war records and
memoirs have emerged since the early 2010s, a chance to further our

Carl Vincent, No Reason Why: the Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy: an Examination
(Stittsville, Ontario: Canada’s Wings Inc., 1981); Brereton Greenhous, “C” Force to
Hong Kong: a Canadian Catastrophe, 1941-1945 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997);
Charles Roland, Long Night’s Journey into Day: Prisoners of War in Hong Kong and
Japan, 1941-1945 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001); Terry
Copp, “The Defence of Hong Kong December 1941,” Canadian Military History 10, 4
(2001): 5–20; Nathan Greenfield, The Damned: the Canadians at the Battle of Hong
Kong and the POW Experience, 1941–45 (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010);
and Perras, “Defeat Still Cries Aloud for Explanation,” 37–47.
10  
Oliver Lindsay, The Lasting Honour: The Fall of Hong Kong, 1941 (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Phillip Bruce, Second to None: the Story of the Hong
Kong Volunteers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); Tony Banham, Not
the Slightest Chance: the Defence of Hong Kong, 1941 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2003); Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the
Japanese Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); and Oliver Lindsay,
The Battle for Hong Kong 1941–1945: Hostage to Fortune (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2005).
11  
Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Gudu qianshao: taipingyang zhanzheng zhong
de xianggang zhanyi [Exposed Outpost: The Battle of Hong Kong in the Pacific
War] (Hong Kong: Cosmos, 2013); Kwong Chi Man, Laobing busi: xianggang huazhi
yingbing [Old Soldiers Never Die: Hong Kong Chinese Servicemen of the British
Armed Forces] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2014); and Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi
Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress.
12  
David Macri, Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations’ Proxy War
with Japan, 1935–1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012); and Philip
Cracknell, Battle for Hong Kong.
9  
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understanding of the battle and clear up some unsettled issues by
cross-referencing different primary sources has emerged.

the battle of hong kong spatial history project
The Battle of Hong Kong Spatial History Project (hereafter “the
BoHK Project” or “the Project”), launched in June 2020, aims to
narrate the battle through visualisation and spatial history.13 The
Project’s deliverables include an interactive map of the battle and a
database of its related British military structures. To prepare for the
BoHK Project, the research team completed a pilot project focusing
on the history of the British Army Aid Group, an MI9 organisation
operating in Hong Kong and South China after the fall of Hong Kong.
The pilot project allowed the research team to familiarise themselves
with basic SH skills such as georeferencing, dataset preparation and
related software usage.14
As Richard White suggests, “visualization and spatial history
… is a means of doing research; it generates questions that might
otherwise go unasked, revealing historical relations that might
otherwise go unnoticed, and it undermines, or substantiates, stories
upon which we build our own versions of the past.”15 The Project
seeks to examine previous arguments about the battle and attempts
to identify previously overlooked details and relations. Since the
inception of geographic information system (GIS) technologies, there
have been numerous SH works related to military history as it is
easier to narrate a battle through maps.16 Interactive maps provide
readers ready access to an overview of a battle, while the author of

Link to the project: https://digital.lib.hkbu.edu.hk/1941hkbattle/en/index.html.
The project has been supported financially by the Quality Education Fund and
the research team has received kind support from the Royal British Legion, Hong
Kong Veteran Commemorative Association, Digital Services of Hong Kong Baptist
University Library and Knowledge Transfer Office at Hong Kong Baptist University.
14  
“Hong Kong Resistance: the British Army Aid Group, 1942–1945 - A Spatial
History Project (Scroll Down to Open Map),” accessed 13 February 2021, https://
digital.lib.hkbu.edu.hk/history/baag.php.
15  
Richard White, “What is Spatial History?” Spatial History Lab (1 February 2010):
6,
https://web.stanford.edu/group/spatialhistory/media/images/publication/
what%20is%20spatial%20history%20pub%20020110.pdf.
16  
The largest scale of these work is Project ‘44, “The Road to Liberation,” accessed
13 February 2021, https://www.project44.ca/.
13  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 1
6

Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong

any textual account must make necessary choices regarding the focus
of the narrative. In every battle, there are inter-related events that
occur in various locations, which make them challenging to relate if
they are being textually narrated. Hence, maps are essential for any
battle account. Despite the necessity of maps, print maps suffer from
several limitations: the readers must flip through multiple pages to
see the changing situation; they may find it difficult to follow the
events if they are not familiar with the battlefield; if the maps are
heavily annotated, readers may find them difficult to read; and if the
maps prioritise clarity over the volume of information, readers may
not understand the complete picture.
Military-history-related SH projects, however, also have
limitations. First, the cost of conducting SH projects can be
considerable, even with the latest technology. Investigators must learn
to use related software or relevant computer languages or cooperate
with GIS and information technology specialists who may not possess
the relevant historical knowledge. The author of this article, the
principal investigator of the BoHK Project, has been working with
a group of graphic design and information technology specialists on
the user interface and user experience of the interactive map and
database. Had the author not been supported by a substantial grant
from public sources, this project could not have been conceived.
Investigators need to provide the manpower to compile datasets
based on primary sources. The BoHK Project Team consulted twenty
British and fourteen Japanese war diaries and other primary sources
such as memoirs and regimental histories. Secondary sources were
also included, particularly works by Tony Banham, Philip Cracknell,
Kwong Chi Man and Rusty Tsoi Yiu Lun. The team then divided the
eighteen-day battle into fifty “layers,” each representing the situation
of a particular moment. The intervals between layers vary between
one day and four to six hours to represent the intensive actions and
movements that occurred during different phases of the battle.
The Project illustrates the movement of over 160 units and
subunits from both sides (72 British and Commonwealth units,
excluding the fixed batteries; 78 Japanese units; and one Chinese
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unit)17 by including them as points of interest (POIs) on the map. The
source for a unit’s location is usually the unit’s war diaries, supported
by collaborating sources such as other war diaries and memoirs. The
POIs are placed at approximately the centre point of the unit’s front,
but in the context of Hong Kong a unit’s frontage could be as narrow
as a road’s width, especially during the battle of Hong Kong Island.
Many of the war diaries on both sides contained detailed records of
events and geographical information such as map grids. However, for
some units that lost most of their officers, such as the Indian infantry
battalions and the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery, the war
diaries were less clear. These gaps in knowledge are often filled by
war diaries of higher-level commands such as the Fortress War Diary
or the East Brigade War Diary, narratives of other units, survivors’
personal memoirs and official Japanese records. The first position of
most British units, unless otherwise stated, is marked according to
the last version of the Defence Scheme, revised after the arrival of
the C Force.18
The Japanese war diaries, while more complete than those of
other groups, contained gaps until the recent discovery of more
records, regimental histories and maps concerning the battle. The
38th Division’s account was unclear about individual units’ positions
during the battle, but this was compensated by the use of the war
diaries of other units, which have recently been made available.
Some of these units, such as the 20th Independent Mountain Gun
Battalion, maintained the original texts of their orders received from
higher commands. These orders contain temporal and geographical
information that allow us to pinpoint certain units’ positions
throughout the battle. Most importantly, the 23rd Army and the

The calculation method here avoids double counting a scattered unit that is
represented by multiple POIs; for example, the guns of the 965th Defence Battery
were scattered across Hong Kong Island to defend the beaches. They are counted as
a single unit here.
18  
This Defence Scheme, based on the Interim Defence Scheme that was updated
in 1939, was drafted just before the outbreak of the war. It has never been used in
any studies about the Battle of Hong Kong as it was not purchased from a private
collector until 2018. The scheme is now part of the collection of the Hong Kong
Museum of Coastal Defence (MCD).
17  
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38th Division staff created several comprehensive battle maps that
show the Japanese units’ disposition before and during the battle.19
The research team also included information about British
defence structures in the interactive map. There were 12 coastal
defence gun batteries, 9 anti-aircraft gun batteries, 30 observation
posts, 11 headquarters and command posts, 32 searchlight positions,
211 pillboxes and 68 structures such as shelters, magazines, barracks,
field hospitals and disused batteries. The positions and functions of
these structures were recorded in 1939 and 1941 Defence Schemes
and their states in the early 2020s updated through a study of aerial
photographs and fieldwork. The database enhances our understanding
of major military structures such as the Gin Drinker’s Line20 and
reveals the substantial works conducted by the British from the 1930s
to prepare Hong Kong for an invasion which have often been too
easily dismissed by various analyses of the battle.21
To allow the viewers of the interactive map to better understand
Hong Kong in 1941, the Project team georeferenced several historical
maps and added them as layers that can be viewed with the POIs. The
research team benefitted from Historic Maps Hong Kong, a website

These maps reveal that only a small number of troops existed immediately along
the border days before the war. At that time, Maltby still reported to Singapore and
London that he could not detect large-scale troop movements in the border area. It
was not until the evening of 7 December that the troops rapidly approached Hong
Kong from places such as Po Kat, around ten kilometres from the border. This
helped to debunk one of the myths surrounding the Battle of Hong Kong; namely,
that Maltby refused to believe that Japanese troops were situated immediately
across the front in the days before the battle.
20  
The Gin Drinker’s Line was a defensive line along the Kowloon Ridge that
separated Kowloon Peninsula from the New Territories. It consisted of around 100
concrete-built structures, including pillboxes, observation posts, shelters and an
underground defended locality known as the Shing Mun Redoubt. For a detailed
discussion about the Line, see Kwong Chi Man, “Reconstructing the Early History of
the Gin Drinker’s Line from Archival Sources,” Surveying and Built Environment 22,
1 (2012): 19-36. Largely based on the works of Rob Weir and through the reading of
aerial photographs and field work, Lawrence Lai has produced a map of the location
of the pillboxes along the Gin Drinker’s Line. See Lawrence Lai, “The Gin Drinker’s
Line: Reconstruction of a British Colonial Defence Line in Hong Kong Using Aerial
Photo Information,” Property Management 27, 1 (2009): 16-41; and Lawrence Lai,
Stephen N. G. Davis, Ken S. T. Ching and Castor T. C. Wong, “Location of Pillboxes
and Other Structures of the Gin Drinker’s Line Based on Aerial Photo Evidence,”
Surveying & Build Environment 21, 2 (December 2011): 69-70.
21  
However, field works such as trenches are omitted from the database as records
about them are incomplete and postwar aerial photographs show trenches built by the
Japanese after the fall of Hong Kong, making it difficult to determine which are extant.
19  
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dedicated to georeferencing historical maps.22 While historical maps
are relatively easy to come by, they are not always accurate and no
existing map accurately shows the whole of Hong Kong in 1941. The
closest candidate is the 1:20,000 1939 Ordnance Map of Hong Kong,
photolithographed in 1945 but drawn and heliographed during the
Ordnance Survey in 1939.23 Based on the 1939 Ordnance Map, the
Japanese produced several maps when they planned their operations.
The research team included two of these, one produced in 1939 and
the other in October 1941, to show how much the Japanese knew
about the British defences in Hong Kong.24

new observations
planning and operational effectiveness

The research team first compiled a complete order of battle of the
British and Japanese forces. While the order of battle of the British
and Commonwealth forces that participated in the battle is well
known, previous studies have been less clear about the composition
of the Japanese forces. Maltby recalled that he faced two Japanese
infantry divisions supported by an assortment of air and naval
units.25 Some recent works have suggested that as many as three
divisions attacked Hong Kong.26 The invading Japanese forces, under
the operational control of the 23rd Army, consisted of the 38th
Division; the 1st Artillery Brigade/Group; the 14th, 19th and 20th
See Historic Maps Hong Kong, accessed 12 February 2021, http://www.hkmaps.
hk/mapviewer.html.
23  
The next update took place in 1949, which included all the changes since the
end of the war in 1945. See http://www.hkmaps.hk/mapviewer.html (accessed 12
February 2021).
24  
“Honkon bōgyo shisetsu to [Map of Hong Kong Defences],” 1938, georeferenced
by Historic Maps Hong Kong, accessed 12 February 2021, http://www.hkmaps.hk/
mapviewer.html; and “Honkon fukin ei kunigun bōbi jōkyō to [Map Showing the
British Military Defences in Hong Kong],” Nan-shi 35, National Institute for Defence
Studies, Japan.
25  
“Operations in Hong Kong from 8 to 25 December 1941 (Despatch from the
Supplement to the London Gazette),” London Gazette, 29 January 1948, 703.
26  
Lieutenant-Colonel George Trist suggested that Hong Kong was attacked by two
to five divisions. See Lieutenant-Colonel George Trist, “Report on the Part Played
by Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong Kong,” Canadian Military History
10, 4 (2001): 23.
22  
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Engineer Regiments; the 10th Mountain Gun Regiment; the 2nd and
5th Rapid-firing Gun Battalions; the 20th Mountain Gun Battalion;
and the 21st Mortar Battalion. The 38th Division had mountain
gun and engineer regiments (the 38th Mountain Gun Regiment and
the 38th Engineer Regiment) and the 1st Artillery Brigade/Group
consisted of one heavy artillery (the 1st) and one heavy field gun
regiment (the 14th) as well as two heavy field gun regiments (the
2nd and 3rd) and one heavy mortar battalion (the 12th). In all, the
Japanese forces had three infantry regiments (the 228th, 229th and
230th), nine infantry battalions (three battalions in each regiment),
four engineer regiments, four artillery regiments and seven artillery
battalions. A mixed brigade (the 66th, around 6,000 men) guarded
the Hong Kong–China border throughout the battle. As for naval
forces, the Japanese Second China Fleet deployed one 5,500-ton light
cruiser, three destroyers, four torpedo boats, three gunboats, several
auxiliary vessels and five seaplanes. The invading force enjoyed air
supremacy and was supported by a light bomber wing, a fighter
squadron and several reconnaissance planes.27
The spatial history approach helps clarify two common
criticisms against Major General Maltby, who has been accused of
underestimating the number of Japanese troops across the border and
overlooking the possibility of a landward invasion. He was noted to
have told the Canadians that there were only 5,000 Japanese troops
across the border.28 This claim should be placed in a proper spatial
and temporal context as Maltby’s claim was technically correct
before the war’s outbreak. The 38th Division and the artillery units
that attacked Hong Kong were stationed east of Canton (Guangzhou)
until the last week of November and did not approach within thirty
kilometres of the border until December 7.29 Maltby’s intelligence
branch failed to detect the invading force because the Japanese
launched a feint attack on Guangxi; thus, the British only detected
a sizeable Japanese force across the border on 6 December.30 Maltby
wrote to his wife on 30 November: “I do not think this state of
Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 167-71.
Trist, “Report on the Part Played by Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong
Kong,” 22.
29  
“Honkon kōryakusen sentō keika yōzu [Map of the Battle of Hong Kong],” January
1942, Ref: C13031840200, Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records (JACAR).
30  
“Fortress War Diary,” Appendix B1, 1, WO (War Office Records) 106/2401A, The
National Archives, United Kingdom (TNA).
27  
28  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss2/1

10

Kwong: Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong
KWONG

11

tension can last much longer. It will either be a showdown or Japan
will have to pipe down. I am as set here as I can be without putting
everyone out their manning positions and that can be done in a very
short time.”31 As early as 30 November, the Mainland Brigade was
deployed along the Gin Drinker’s Line.32
This project allows us to appreciate the interconnectedness of
the land, naval and air dimensions of the battle. Contrary to claims
made after the war, the garrison prepared for the invasion as far as
manpower and resources allowed.33 Previous studies on the battle
focused on actions on land. The BoHK Project, however, highlights
the combined nature of the British defence planning and the role of
the services and branches. The Project team also benefitted from
reading the recently discovered last edition of the Defence Scheme,
revised in November 1941 when the two Canadian battalions arrived
in Hong Kong. According to the Defence Scheme, the garrison was
to “deny the anchorage to the enemy” and “maintain a footing in
the colony.”34 The garrison had to hold Hong Kong Island as long as
possible to achieve these goals. The plan stated that an invasion from
the New Territories, a direct attack on Hong Kong Island, a landing
in the area south of the Gin Drinker’s Line and combinations of all
these methods were possible.35
Instead of merely a land-focused plan, the British possessed a
combined scheme that tried to integrate all assets available to the
garrison. The garrison attempted to use firepower and permanent
defences to prolong its resistance and compensate for the lack of
manpower. The British used coastal artillery (Fig. 1) to provide longrange fire support for the troops along the Gin Drinker’s Line, which
spanned across the Kowloon Ridge that overlooked the north shore of
Hong Kong Island. The garrison prepared fire plans for the emergency
shelling of certain positions where the Japanese forces were expected
to pass. To make the plan work, the British constructed a system of
fire command that used fixed telephone lines to connect the artillery
commands (divided into East and West Fire Command), the fixed and
prepared mobile artillery positions and observation posts. Preparing
“Hong Kong, 30 November 1941,” in C. M. Maltby Scrapbook, Document 22835,
Imperial War Museum Collection (IWM).
32  
“A Brief Resume of Events from December 1941 Onwards,” 1, Document 3671, IWM.
33  
Copp, “The Defence of Hong Kong,” 7.
34  
“Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941,” Part I, 1, MCD.
35  
“Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941”, Part I, 1, MCD.
31  
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Figure 1: Disposition of the British and Commonwealth garrison on 8 December 1941; the blue POIs show the Gin Drinker’s Line and the Coast Defence
Batteries on Hong Kong Island and Stonecutters Island. [All images in this article are screenshots courtesy of the Battle of Hong Kong Spatial History Project]
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this elaborate communication system took more than a year.36 A 1938
combined exercise report suggested that the garrison should be “linked
up like a battleship.”37 As the garrison had no air cover, it had to rely
on anti-aircraft guns on Hong Kong Island to protect the coastal
defence guns and other defences, ground troops and naval vessels.
Although the Royal Navy only had one destroyer, two usable gunboats
and six motor torpedo boats throughout the battle, it augmented the
garrison’s firepower in locations where the coastal guns could not
bear effectively, such as the coastline of Castle Peak Bay north of
Stonecutters Island. In addition, the navy played a role in assisting the
withdrawal of the garrison from Kowloon and, from at least 1940, the
Royal Navy jointly exercised with the ground troops.
Maltby ordered three battalions to fight a delaying action on the
mainland to buy time for the garrison to prepare for the siege of the
Island and he expected to hold the Gin Drinker’s Line for around
seven days.38 His Japanese counterparts made similar estimations.39
Maltby stated his intention in the 1941 Defence Scheme: “the role… [of
the troops on the mainland] is that of a rear-guard. Their task is the
very difficult one to inflict the maximum loss and delay on an enemy
advance with the minimum loss to themselves. It must be assumed
that the enemy will be using his best troops, will be advancing in
considerable force, and will be ‘all-out’ to reach Kowloon as quickly as
possible.”40 Had he sent more troops to the mainland, Maltby might
lose more troops there and had fewer troops for the defence of the
Island. Had he sent fewer troops, the fall of Kowloon might have been
too quick to allow the garrison to move vital supplies to the Island.
An attempt to engage in street-to-street fighting in Kowloon might
entrap the British troops there and cause numerous civilian losses. As
for his plan for the Island, Maltby has been accused of scattering his
assets.41 However, an overview of the battlefield justifies his concern,
as Maltby lacked the means to protect the long shoreline of Hong
Kong Island and detect incoming attacks. Moreover, although a thrust
from the north was the most likely, Maltby could not concentrate his
Eustace Levett, “And then—the Soldier,” in Private Papers of Lieutenant Colonel
E O Levett OBE, 156–64, Document 26105, IWM.
37  
“Report on Combined Operations: Hong Kong,” 13, March 1938, WO 196/9, TNA.
38  
“Operations in Hong Kong from 8 to 25 December 1941,” 700.
39  
Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 169.
40  
“Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941,” Part VI, Section C, 1, MCD.
41  
Copp, “The Defence of Hong Kong,” 10.
36  
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troops on the northern shore. The Japanese artillery could decimate
those troops before landing operations, as Japanese guns could easily
reach the north shore of the Island and the northward slope behind it.
Thus, Maltby had fewer options than is generally assumed. Fortunate
for Maltby, the poor coordination of the Japanese army and navy
spared him from facing an attack from both the north and south sides
of the Island.
To protect outnumbered troops from shelling and air attacks,
the British built numerous concrete pillboxes, shelters and storage
facilities in Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island. The idea of building
a static defence line was first proposed in 1930, which led to the
construction of the “Gin Drinker’s Line.” The line was intended to be
the “inner line” of a three-layered defensive zone covering the New
Territories, but the other two layers never materialised.42 Although
further work on the Gin Drinker’s Line was stopped in July 1938,
more defensive structures were later built on Hong Kong Island. The
most significant of these works include the concentration of all coastal
batteries and anti-aircraft guns on the Island and the modernisation
of coastal batteries such as Mount Davis Fortress.43 The British built
seventy-one44 splinter-proof45 pillboxes on Hong Kong Island, most
of which were located along the shoreline, supported by Lyon Lights
for beach defence. They also built eighteen “Locality Pillboxes” in
mountain valleys on the Island, including the three pillboxes in Wong
Nai Chung Gap which inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese forces.
These localities aimed to provide strong points that would delay the
Japanese advance and deny them the heights. The garrison also built
two fortress plotting rooms in Mount Davis and Tai Tam as command
centres for the Fire Commands. Shelters were built near pre-arranged
defended localities and mobile artillery positions south of the Kowloon
Ridge and the Island, providing concrete accommodations and storage
facilities (Fig 2).

Kwong Chi Man, “Reconstructing the Early History of the Gin Drinker’s Line
from Archival Sources,” Surveying and Built Environment 22, 1 (2012): 19–36.
43  
Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 107–15.
44  
The Defence Scheme recorded seventy-two pillboxes but one of them, PB 45,
was possibly only a machine gun emplacement rather than a complete pillbox. The
author thanks Tony Banham and Rob Weir for this information.
45  
These splinter proof pillboxes had concrete walls that were 30–70 mm thick and
could not withstand direct hit from field guns. “Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme,
1941,” Part I, 1, MCD.
42  
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Figure 2: Pillboxes and concrete shelters on Hong Kong Island.

In short, one should not easily dismiss the garrison’s effort in
using static defences to compensate for the shortage in manpower
as a reflection of the garrison commanders’ “First World War
mentality.” The garrison’s senior commanders, such as Maltby
and his Chief of Staff Colonel Lance Newnham, were aware of the
garrison’s “Maginot-mindedness” and the problem of covering a large
area that consisted of a complex shoreline and rugged terrain with
four (later six) battalions.46 The Defence Scheme also warned the
troops manning the Gin Drinker’s Line to not rely on fixed lines
and pillboxes.47 Soon after he arrived in Hong Kong, Maltby raised
a local machine gun battalion to man the pillboxes on Hong Kong
Island so that the Middlesex Battalion, an infantry unit that was
converted into a machine gun battalion after Maltby arrived in Hong
Kong, could be freed as a general reserve for mobile operations and
“A Volunteer Remembers,” unpublished memoir of Colonel Harry Owen-Hughes,
Bundle III, 8, Elizabeth Ride Collection, Hong Kong University Library.
47  
“Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941,” Part III, Section K, 13, MCD.
46  
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local counterattacks.48 However, when the Japanese forces attacked,
the local battalion, known as the Hong Kong Chinese Regiment,
had only a nucleus strength of fifty-six men. With the arrival of
the Canadian brigade, the garrison tried to update the defence
scheme while considering the additional transport. To add further
complication, the garrison’s mobility was critically limited by the
lack of wireless radio, a fact that forced much of the garrison to rely
on static structures that had pre-arranged means of communication.
In contrast, the Japanese forces, which had more manpower and
resources, performed poorly in operational planning and execution.
One of the most widely circulated myths about the battle was
that the Japanese had very detailed knowledge about Hong Kong’s
defences before the battle. Historians have suggested that Japanese
spies penetrated various parts of the Hong Kong civil establishment
and had given Tokyo the most updated British plans and the location
of British defences. This claim has not been supported by much
evidence. On the one hand, the Japanese forces had a general picture
of the static defences of the garrison as shown by the map prepared
by the staff of the 23rd Army.49 Although the map gave the planners
a general idea of Hong Kong’s defences, it presented numerous
inaccuracies. For example, while the map showed the major batteries
on Hong Kong Island, the two decommissioned coastal batteries on
the Kowloon side—Gough and Pottinger batteries, which were listed
as being equipped with 9-inch guns—and some of the pillboxes along
the Gin Drinker’s Line, including the Shing Mun Redoubt, the map
failed to locate most of the pillboxes, especially the locality pillboxes.
Worse, the above information was not shared with the Imperial
Japanese Navy (IJN) which carried out its reconnaissance missions
in mid-November. The IJN search planes could not even locate the
coastal defence guns on the southern side of Hong Kong Island.50
While many accounts illustrate the solid combat effectiveness of
the Japanese soldiers and some of the junior officers, especially during
night engagements, the Japanese forces that attacked Hong Kong were
poorly handled at the operational level. Spatial history helps us to

“GOC Hong Kong to WO,” 8 August 1941, WO 208/725, TNA.
“Honkon fukin ei kunigun bōbi jōkyō to [Map Showing the British Military
Defences in Hong Kong],” Nan-shi 35, National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan.
50  
“Dai san kōkūtai sentō shōhō dai sangō [War Diary of 3rd Squadron, No. 3],”
January 1942, Ref: C14120704000, JACAR.
48  
49  
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Figure 3: Japanese and British troops along the border in the morning of 8 December 1941.

understand this problem by showing the Japanese forces’ deployment
during different stages of the battle. The Japanese advance into the
New Territories started with an imagined encirclement of non-existent
enemy positions along the border (Fig 3). The Japanese staff then
planned a daytime frontal offensive along the Gin Drinker’s Line,
evenly distributing the infantry battalions along the front. Only the
victory at Shing Mun Redoubt, much to the surprise of the Japanese
commanders, allowed the Japanese to quickly overcome the British
right flank. The commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment (230i)51
then launched a costly frontal morning assault against Golden Hill
(Fig 4). After that, the Japanese forces grew overcautious and failed
to catch the retreating Mainland Brigade (Fig 5), which crossed
Victoria Harbour.
Compared to their plan for the New Territories and Kowloon, the
Japanese plan for Hong Kong Island was flimsy at best. Again, the
Japanese commanders planned a general advance along a broad front
with troops evenly distributed between the regimental boundaries.
Communication between regiments was almost non-existent until
days after landing. Cooperation between the ground troops and naval
forces did not exist and no attempts were made to feint a southward
The short form of a Japanese infantry regiment such as “230i” follows the Japanese
practice and is consistent with the maps attached to Japanese records.

51  
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Figure 4: British and Japanese troops in Kowloon after the fall of Shing Mun Redoubt, 10 December 1941.
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Figure 5: British withdrawal from Kowloon, 11-13 December 1941.
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invasion to tie down the British troops, which freely moved toward
the northeastern and eastern parts of the Island. When 230i was in
Wong Nai Chung Gap, other Japanese battalions lined up in Stanley
Gap for a day without trying to exploit the situation either north
or south of the Wong Nai Chung Gap (Fig 6). The Japanese troops
in the Gap launched repeated frontal assaults that led to hundreds
of casualties. They captured various positions mainly through sheer
numbers, as the Japanese commanders had yet to decide to move
their artillery to the Island. When the East Brigade’s presence at
Stanley was detected due to its counterattack on 20 December, the
Japanese commander hastily gathered almost all his troops that were
not engaged and sent them there. Although the East Brigade could
have been blockaded with fewer troops because it faced unfavourable
terrain and lacked artillery (Fig 7), the result was carnage in Stanley
on 24 and 25 December and heavy losses on both sides because
the Japanese commander insisted on sending a large force to attack
the East Brigade with little strategic gain. In all, the Japanese
commanders were unimaginative, although they adapted to the
situation before total disaster struck thanks to a competent group of
staff officers who quickly grasped the situation.52
There is no evidence showing that the 23rd Army and the Second
China Fleet had any in-depth discussion over operational cooperation,
although an IJN representative was stationed at the headquarters
of the 23rd Army throughout the battle. During the invasion, the
Second China Fleet could not assist in operations as the coastal guns
in Hong Kong prevented its major units from approaching the Island.
The IJN Marines only participated in the landing of the evacuated
Tsing Yi Island on 12 December, where two anti-aircraft searchlight
positions existed. The IJN heavy bombers, which attacked Hong
Kong on 16 December, focused on the Royal Naval Dockyard at
Aberdeen rather than the coastal guns that prevented the naval
vessels from supporting the ground operations. Early destruction of
the Stanley guns would have allowed the Japanese to capture the
Four out of six staff officers of the Fortress Headquarters were killed while trying
to ascertain the situation at the front. Oliver Lindsay, The Lasting Honour: The
Fall of Hong Kong 1941 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 127. For an example
of the Japanese staff officers’ work at the front, see “Dai sanhachi shidan honkon
kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary of the 38th Division: the Battle of Hong Kong],”
Chapter VI, 228 (slide 24), Ref: C13031768600, JACAR. The British faced a similar
problem with different results.

52  
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Figure 6: Japanese troops congregated at Wong Nai Chung Gap and Stanley Gap, instead of approaching the City of Victoria from different sides.

21

22

Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong

Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 1

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss2/1

Figure 7: The East Brigade’s failed counterattack on 20 December.
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Stanley Peninsula with their marines long before the East Brigade
could barricade itself in the Peninsula. The IJA air force made the
same mistake of not trying to attack the coastal batteries on the
southern side of the Island except for once on the 18th.53 Thus, the
IJN could not exert any pressure on the garrison from the south.
Similarly, after the capture of Kowloon, the IJA artillery did not
prioritise reducing the garrison’s anti-aircraft firepower so that the
air elements could play a greater role, although the Pinewood AntiAircraft Battery was destroyed because of its exposed position.54

the role and impact of the canadian forces

While the outline of the battle is well known, gaps still exist in the
narrative, especially concerning the role and performance of C Force.
The SH approach allows us to appreciate C Force’s experience better
as it reveals the interaction between the British, Commonwealth
and Japanese forces and shows the impact of specific actions on the
flow of events. First, it is difficult to connect and analyse multiple
interrelated events in separate spaces in textual narratives. Second,
first-hand accounts may describe the same event differently and
omit the linkage between events. Of the various units that had
participated in the battle, the Canadian troops’ experience was the
most confusing because of several factors. First, the two Canadian
battalions, the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers,
were new to Hong Kong and the officers and men were still
familiarising themselves with the ground when the invasion began.
The two battalions were allotted to different brigades and, although
one of them was under the direct control of C Force Commander
Brigadier-General John Lawson, he and his staff were killed during
the battle. To make matters worse, the commander of the Winnipeg
Grenadiers, Colonel John Sutcliffe, died during captivity.55 Thus,
the account of the Winnipeg Grenadiers is less clear than other
“War Diary and Narrative of East Infantry Brigade,” in Brigadier C. R. Templer,
20, Document 40186, IWM.
54  
“Dai sanhachi shidan honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary of the
38th Division: the Battle of Hong Kong],” Chapter VI, 181-82 (slides 1–2), Ref:
C13031768600, JACAR.
55  
Trist, “Report on the Part Played by Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong
Kong,” 21–26.
53  
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battalions, with the possible exception of the Punjab Battalion,
which had also lost its commanding officer and many other officers.
The chain of command of the Royal Rifles remained relatively intact
throughout the battle and it produced a more detailed account of
its actions. Further information can be drawn from the account
Brigadier Cedric Wallis, left of the actions of the East Brigade. While
both accounts contained some errors, they can be cross-checked with
other accounts, such as that of Captain Peter Belton who served as
a staff officer of the East Brigade, and the Japanese records.56
The C Force witnessed almost every stage of the battle of Hong
Kong at the forefront, except during the opening skirmishes along the
border. During the battle for Kowloon, D Company of the Winnipeg
Grenadiers (D/WG) was sent to Kwai Chung on the evening of 10
December to shore up the crumbling line of the Royal Scots, who
were facing attack from three Japanese battalions (II/230i, III/230i
and III/228i) with ample artillery support (37-mm quick-firing guns
and 75-mm mountain guns). By mid-day of 11 December, the Royal
Scots withdrew to the Golden Hill–Kwai Chung line after losing two
company commanders (B and C companies). By then, the Japanese
forces had breached the left-wing of the Gin Drinker’s Line, which
only had a depth of approximately 1.5 km. In this context, D/WG
could do little but hold a position near Lai Chi Kok and then withdraw
with the rest of the garrison to Hong Kong Island later that day. At
the same time, the Indian troops (mainly from the Rajput Battalion
and a battery of the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery) fought
a rear-guard action first near Tseng Lan Shue (Chin Lan Chu) and
then at Devil’s Peak Peninsula (Fig. 8).
During the battle for Hong Kong Island from 18 to 25 December
1941, C Force witnessed heavy but very confusing fighting in Sai
Wan, Mount Parker, Mount Butler, Tai Tam, Wong Nai Chung Gap,
Stanley and Aberdeen. At around 20:30 hrs on 18 December, four
and a half battalions of 228i and 230i landed at Tai Koo and North
Point, overwhelming the Rajput defences. Meanwhile, the II/229i
and III/229i landed at Lyemun and Aldrich Bay after crossing the
500 metre-wide Lyemun Channel from Yau Tong. While previous
accounts focused on the confusion and hinted at the garrison’s lack
of response, both the East and West Brigades sent mobile columns
to the northeast sector of the Island, which largely accorded with
“A Brief Resume of Events from December 1941 Onwards,” Document 3671, IWM.

56  
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the Defence Scheme. A mobile platoon from the Middlesex Battalion
was sent to North Point, where it was ambushed near the North
Point Power Station. The Headquarters (HQ) Company of Winnipeg
Grenadiers also sent three platoon-sized mobile columns to Mount
Butler via the Stanley Gap.57 One platoon (5th58) of Royal Rifles
was sent to the summit of Mount Parker, with two platoons (the 9th
and 12th) reinforcing Boa Vista, a height between Mount Parker
and Gauge Basin (near Tai Tam Reservoir). The purpose of these
moves was to shore up the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps
(HKVDC) positions on the hills—Jardine’s Lookout, Mount Butler
and Mount Parker—and prevent further penetration by the Japanese
forces. A Company of Winnipeg Grenadiers (A/WG) later joined the
HQ platoons moving toward Mount Butler.
However, with a numerical superiority of ten to one, the Japanese
forces quickly overran the Rajputs and within hours had gained a
foothold. At around 22:00 hrs, 229i had already taken Sau Ki Wan
and Lyemun Redoubt (installed only with dummy guns) and was
pushing toward Sai Wan Fort (which was converted into an antiaircraft battery with three 3-inch anti-aircraft guns), capturing the
position soon afterward.59 The East Group Royal Artillery account
alleges that troops from C Company of the Royal Rifles (C/RR)
failed to launch a counterattack to recapture Sai Wan Fort.60 The
Canadian report states that the troops attempting to approach the
fort from the west were held up by a “perpendicular twenty-foot brick
wall.” 61 Georeferenced aerial photographs clearly show the wall in
question (Fig. 9). The approach from the north was also impossible,
as fire from the Lyemun Barracks could easily block the northern
entrance to Sai Wan Fort.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe was at the Fortress Headquarters, the decision to
send in the mobile columns seems to be one of the earliest reactions of the Fortress
Headquarters toward the Japanese landing. Trist, “Report on the Part Played by
Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 21.
58  
With two sections from 2nd Platoon. See “Canadian Participation in the Defence
of Hong Kong,” 34, November 1946, CAB 44/316, TNA.
59  
Later, the unit killed twenty-eight gunners from the 5th Anti-Aircraft Battery,
HKVDC and 5th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery. The same night,
229i troops slaughtered the British, Canadian and Hong Kong medical personnel of
the First Aid Post at Salesian Mission near Sau Ki Wan.
60  
“Royal Artillery Report on Operations in Hong Kong in December 1941,” 11, WO
172/1687, TNA.
61  
“Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 33.
57  
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Sai Wan AA
Battery, 18-19
December
1941.
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C/RR then withdrew with the gunners and formed a position
southwest of Sai Wan Fort, holding the southern end of Chai Wan
Gap. As the defenders were strengthening the Chai Wan Gap
position, the two battalions of 229i, with around 1,200 men, did
not press on along the Island Road and instead moved west, with
a company advancing toward the summit of Mount Parker. They
followed their original plan to form a north–south line along Wong
Nai Chung Gap. The 229i was allotted to the southernmost position
of that line and those troops took Mount Parker at 08:00 hrs on 19
December, decimating the 5th Platoon RR there, and pushed on
toward Mount Butler.62 It then continued west toward Stanley Gap,
leaving only one company holding Boa Vista, which the East Brigade
gave up at around noon. To the left of 229i, 228i reached Quarry
Pass after a night of confused fighting against the Rajputs. It also
turned west toward Stanley Gap ahead of 229i, spreading out along
the north–south line between Mount Butler and Tai Tam Reservoir
and clashing headlong with two Winnipeg flying columns and then
A/WG. Thus, between around 08:00 and 11:00 hrs on 19 December,
A Company and two platoons from HQ Company of the Winnipeg
Grenadiers near Mount Butler (a front of approximately 900 metres)
encountered two battalions (I/228i and II/228i), of which at least five
companies were deployed to face the Canadian troops (Fig. 10).63
While A/WG and the flying columns struggled near Mount
Butler, the II/230i and III/230i with two more companies from the
I/230i moved south from North Point to reach Wong Nai Chung Gap
through Sir Cecil’s Ride around Jardine’s Lookout, passing through
D/WG’s position and the West Brigade Headquarters to its west.
As D/WG was below the Ride and the Japanese troops approached
hours after A/WG and the flying columns passed through the area,
no contact was made, although the Royal Scots holding Stubbs Road
spotted the Japanese troops. The vanguard of this group of Japanese
troops was eventually spotted in the early morning of 19 December
near Wong Nai Chung Gap Reservoir and a confusing battle ensued.
The HKVDC, holding pillboxes near the southern end of Sir Cecil’s
“Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 34; and Hohei dai ninikyū
rentaishi hensan īnkai, Hohei dai ninikyū rentaishi (Nagoya: Fukufukukai, 1981), 305–
06. During the engagement, the commanding officer of the 12th Company was killed.
63  
“Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 43–44; and Hohei
ninihachi rentaishi kankōkai, Hohei ninihachi rentaishi (Tokyo: Hohei ninihachi
rentaishi kankōkai, 1974), 88.
62  
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Figure 10: Fighting near Mount Butler, 19 December 1941.
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Ride, inflicted many casualties on 230i. British reinforcements rushed
in throughout the day, but they lacked coordination.64 The 230i,
despite heavy losses, captured the Police Station at the southern end
of Wong Nai Chung Gap but failed to go up Mount Nicholson to its
west. Lawson was killed when he attempted to evacuate the West
Brigade Headquarters in the morning. The Japanese could not push
further in this direction due to heavy losses plus the resistance of
D/WG, the HKVDC and the reinforcements from various units. In
particular, D/WG prevented the Japanese troops from moving north
into Happy Valley via Blue Pool Road as it held the shelters near
the northern end of Wong Nai Chung Gap, thus protecting the flank
of the Blue Pool Road–Leighton Hill position that was manned by
Indian (from both the Rajput and Punjab Battalions) and Middlesex
troops (Fig. 11).65 Not until the afternoon of 22 December did the
Japanese overcome the resistance of D/WG and work their way
north from Happy Valley toward Leighton Hill, the Racecourse and
Morrison Hill.
After the initial actions, the East Brigade left a covering force at
Gauge Basin and withdrew toward Stanley to reorganise. The British
made several mistakes that rendered subsequent counterattacks
impossible. The East Brigade lost all its artillery, save one 3.7-inch
howitzer, during the retreat. Without artillery support, the East
Brigade had to launch repeated frontal assaults from both sides
of Stanley Peninsula against the Japanese who were holding the
height. Second, the East Brigade lost Gauge Basin, the gateway
toward Stanley Gap and Tai Tam Gap, which was not under heavy
pressure at that time because of a communication error involving
No. 1 Company of the HKVDC, the artillery units nearby and
the East Brigade Headquarters (Fig. 12).66 On the morning of 20
December, the East Brigade launched a counterattack toward the
Gap, led by A/RR. The attackers received only minimal artillery
support, a single 18-pounder from the stores and two 6-inch guns of
the Bluff Head Battery, as the coastal guns at Stanley and Chung
Hom Kok could not bear and the West Brigade’s guns were not in

Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress 197–211; Banham, Not the
Slightest Chance 117–99; and Cracknell, Battle for Hong Kong 184–96.
65  
“Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 44–47.
66  
“No. 1 Coy, HKVDC War Diary,” 13, WO 172/1693, TNA.
64  
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Figure 11: D/Winnipeg Grenadiers at Wong Nai Chung Gap, 20 December 1941.
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Figure 12: Situation at Tai Tam and Stanley Gap, noon 19 December 1941.
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communication with the East Brigade.67 The attacking troops were
almost immediately held up by Japanese troops from the II/229i and
III/229i at Middle Spur. After taking Mount Parker on 19 December,
these two battalions moved along Stanley Gap and turned south at
Wong Nai Chung Gap Reservoir along the catchwater, taking the
unguarded Violet Hill and Middle Spur at night.
As the attack stalled in the afternoon, D/RR was ordered to
move northeast toward Stanley Gap from the eastern slope of Violet
Hill via Repulse Bay Gap. After moving across rugged terrain, the
company, accompanied by a staff officer from the East Brigade, met
the Japanese 20th Independent Mountain Gun Battalion near Tai
Tam Byewash Reservoir. There were no other Japanese units in the
vicinity, except for the single 229i company at Boa Vista and troops
near Stanley Gap. Another column of the same battalion met the
HKVDC Bren Carriers at Tai Tam Tuk. On these occasions, both
sides briefly exchanged fire and withdrew and the Japanese suffered
a dozen casualties (Fig. 13).68 The counterattack on 20 December
persuaded the Japanese commander that it was necessary to destroy
the British forces in Stanley as they threatened his flank and rear via
Island Road. To this end, the Japanese deployed their reserve (I/229i)
to Stanley.69 At North Point, the unit was able to move west toward
Causeway Bay against the Leighton Hill position or, if the Japanese
wanted to avoid street fighting in Causeway Bay, exploit the joint
between the Indian troops and the Middlesex Battalion from Caroline
Hill. The decision to send the battalion to Stanley had implications
for the rest of the battle, as it considerably slowed down the Japanese
advance toward Victoria City and prolonged the garrison’s resistance.
The Japanese could have left a much smaller containing force at
Middle Spur, Violet Hill, Gauge Basin and Boa Vista that could have

“War Diary and Narrative of East Infantry Brigade,” 44, Document 40186, IWM.
“Dokuritsu sanpōhei dai niju daitai honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary
of 20th Independent Mountain Gun Battalion: the Battle of Hong Kong],” Part VI,
126–27 (slide 16–17), 1942, Ref: C13031798700, JACAR; “Canadian Participation
in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 36; “A Brief Resume of Events from December 1941
Onwards,” 8, Document 3671, IWM; “War Diary and Narrative of East Infantry
Brigade,” 44, Document 40186, IWM; and “The Royal Rifles of Canada, Hong Kong
War Diary 1st December to 25th December 1941,” 30–31, Hong Kong Veterans
Commemorative Association, accessed 7 March 2021, https://www.hkvca.ca/
historical/RRC-War%20Diary.pdf.
69  
“Dai sanhachi shidan honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary of the 38th
Division: the Battle of Hong Kong],” Chapter VI, 220, Ref: C13031768600, JACAR.
67  
68  
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Figure 13: Counterattack of D/Royal Rifles, afternoon of 20 December 1941.
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effectively bottled the East Brigade up at Stanley as the latter had
no artillery support. Because of the East Brigade’s counterattacks
on 20 December, the Japanese commander directed some of his final
reserves—two companies of I/230i—to Stanley later that day, which
arrived at the front in the afternoon the next day (Fig. 14). Thus,
the East Brigade’s counterattacks, spearheaded on most occasions
by the Royal Rifles, helped to tie down around six to eight infantry
companies (out of a total of thirty-six) of the Japanese forces and
eventually drew the Japanese commanders to launch a regimentalsized offensive toward Stanley Peninsula that contributed little to
the outcome of the battle. In the meantime, as mentioned above,
the Winnipeg Grenadiers endured heavy bombardment on Mount
Cameron and in the Aberdeen area, especially after the Japanese had
deployed their field guns to the Island.
C Force did what it could despite the exceedingly difficult
circumstances. Without Bren Carriers, trucks, mortars and most
importantly adequate artillery support, the two Canadian battalions
lacked the necessary equipment that might have enabled them to fight
the battle they sought to fight. In most cases, the Canadian troops
faced an enemy force that was vastly superior in numbers. They were
sometimes asked to launch frontal assaults against an enemy holding
the high ground with little to no artillery support. They had no air
cover and the anti-aircraft gun positions were captured or knocked
out. They faced heavy artillery bombardment, especially when the
Japanese forces brought in their guns from Kowloon.70 Although the
Canadian troops were sometimes blamed for the defeat, it is unlikely
that other units of the Hong Kong garrison could have done better.

conclusion
A study of the Battle of Hong Kong from the spatial history
perspective shows the potential of using this approach to clarify
events and offer new insights concerning various aspects of the
battle. While the Hong Kong garrison faced heavy odds, the full
extent of the situation cannot be understood until the assets of both
Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 164-67, 204-20. See also the
“1941 Battle of Hong Kong Spatial History Project” map, https://digital.lib.hkbu.
edu.hk/1941hkbattle/en/index.html.
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Figure 14: The East Brigade’s Counterattack near Red Hill on 21 December..

36

Kwong: Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong
KWONG

37

sides are sorted out and examined spatially. This spatial history
project reveals the poor planning and execution of the Japanese
forces and the lack of cooperation between its branches. A review of
the British planning based on the 1941 Defence Scheme reveals the
British garrison’s attempt to maximise its effectiveness with limited
resources to face an enemy force that possessed superior numbers
and firepower. It also shows the garrison’s crucial deficiencies;
namely, the reliance on static lines of communication, lack of reliable
transport and the inability to coordinate its many scattered units. In
addition, the Project clarifies C Force’s experience during the battle
and the impact of its actions. The Canadian infantry battalions were
assigned tasks that they were ill-equipped to handle. Although the
same was true for the entire garrison, C Force was asked to fight a
mobile defensive battle against a much larger enemy force containing
ample artillery and air support. The Japanese forces suffered heavy
losses only because of the garrison’s determined resistance and the
Japanese failures in planning and execution throughout the battle.71
The BoHK Project helps researchers obtain new insights and
is also a useful educational tool. The interactive map it produced
facilitates a quick understanding of the flow of the battle, relevant
localities and events. It also helps the commemorative effort by offering
a space to exhibit the participants’ diverse historical experiences and
a tool to tell the story with audio and visual sources. Furthermore,
it assists in the conservation of the military structures in Hong
Kong that still exist but are in declining condition. Educating the
public about the historical context and the sites’ importance can
better protect them from vandalism.72 With adequate resources, the
BoHK Project could also include features such as three-dimensional
mapping or even evolve into a mobile application. The Project is an
ongoing process that allows future updates based on new materials
and evidence contributed by interested parties worldwide.
◆

◆

◆

◆

In all, the Japanese lost 136 officers and 2,082 other ranks (killed, wounded or
missing) while the British lost 3,445 (killed, wounded or missing). It is worth noting
that the three Japanese regiments lost around 30 per cent of their officers during the
battle. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 222.
72  
“French Int’l School offers to clean graffiti from nearby WWII battle site,” Hong
Kong Free Press, 23 March 2017, https://hongkongfp.com/2017/03/23/french-intlschool-offers-to-clean-graffiti-from-nearby-wwii-battle-site/.
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